2021 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

12-21-2021

F. S. v. Crestwood School District

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021

Recommended Citation
"F. S. v. Crestwood School District" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 1036.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/1036

This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 20-3321
_____________
F. S., by and through her Parent, Pamela Scarano,
Appellant
v.
CRESTWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT; KERRI FEY, individually and in her official
capacity as Head Cheerleading Coach of Crestwood School District
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-19-cv-01593)
District Court Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on
September 24, 2021
______________
Before: MCKEE, RESTREPO and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 21, 2021)
_______________________
OPINION*
_______________________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

McKEE, Circuit Judge.
F.S., by and through her mother, challenges the District Court’s dismissal of her
claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The
District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court held
F.S.’s claims were subject to § 1415(l) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
which requires a claimant to exhaust the statute’s administrative procedures before filing
a civil action.1 Although we are sympathetic to the claims F.S. brought and, if her
allegations are proven, believe that she may well have been treated unfairly, we must
nevertheless affirm the District Court’s order for the reasons set forth below and as
explained in the District Court’s very well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion.
I.
The IDEA serves “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to
them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living.”2 A school’s obligation to provide a free
appropriate public education (FAPE) includes not only academic instruction but also a
variety of supportive services, including transportation, therapeutic, recreational, and
social services, among many others.3
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F. S. v. Crestwood Sch. Dist., No. CV 3:19-1593, 2020 WL 6445985, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
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Section 1415 of the IDEA outlines the required administrative procedures a child
must pursue when seeking relief for a school’s denial of their right to a FAPE.4 Because a
school’s FAPE obligations often overlap with other laws protecting the rights of children
with disabilities, § 1415(l) prescribes the interaction between such laws and the
procedural requirements of the IDEA. Thus, before a claimant can pursue a civil action
under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or other laws protecting the rights of children
with disabilities, they are required to exhaust § 1415’s administrative procedures when
relief is also available under the IDEA.5
Relief is available under the IDEA when the “gravamen” of a plaintiff’s complaint
is the denial of a FAPE.6 Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools held that in discerning
whether a claim concerns the denial of FAPE, courts shall evaluate the “substance, not
surface” of the complaint.7
Fry offers two clues that courts should consider when evaluating the gravamen of
a complaint. The first consists of a pair of hypothetical questions that when answered in
the negative, suggest the claim concerns the denial of a FAPE: “[C]ould the plaintiff have
brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility
that was not a school—say, a public theater or library? And . . . could an adult at the
school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance?”8 The
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second clue to consider is the history of proceedings. “[P]rior pursuit of the IDEA’s
administrative remedies will often provide strong evidence that the substance of a
plaintiff’s claim concerns the denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly
uses that term.”9
The Crestwood School District’s “cheerleading program is ‘not selective’ insofar
as no ‘cuts’ are made to those wishing to participate.”10 The task before us, therefore, is
to determine whether F.S.’s claims—that Defendants’ disability-based discrimination
forced her to cease participating in the school’s cheerleading program—essentially
constitute the denial of a FAPE. We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order
granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.11
II.
A.
We first conclude the gravamen of F.S.’s claims concern the denial of a FAPE and
are thus subject to the IDEA’s administrative requirements. Under the Fry framework, as
well as our own analysis in Wellman v. Butler Area School District, claims that could
“not have occurred outside the school setting and that a nonstudent could not (and would
not) have ‘pressed essentially the same grievance’” concern the denial of a FAPE.12 That
is the case here. A “mostly identical complaint” to the one F.S. filed in the District Court
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could not be brought against a public facility, nor could an adult visitor or employee of
the school bring such a claim.13 Instead, Defendants’ alleged conduct excluded F.S. from
participation in the school’s cheerleading program, thus denying her the FAPE they are
required to provide under the IDEA.
Certainly, the ability to participate in extracurricular activities, such as
cheerleading, is a part of a child’s educational experience.14 Indeed, a student may well
believe involvement in such activities is more rewarding and fulfilling than the more
doctrinal aspects of an education. We doubt that many students will value time spent
reading Shakespeare or studying history more than the time they devote to extracurricular
activities. This is supported by the requirement that Individualized Education Programs,
schools’ primary vehicles in providing a FAPE, include provisions for the “participat[ion]
in extracurricular and other nonacademic activities.”15 F.S.’s exclusion from such an
activity, causing her to suffer “substantial educational and development losses . . . [and]
permanent decline in her future development,”16 is the denial of educational benefits and
the IDEA provides the appropriate relief.
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This conclusion does not mean that all involvement in extracurricular activities
necessarily falls within the scope of a school’s FAPE requirement. Nor do we suggest
that activities not enumerated in an IEP necessarily fall outside a FAPE. Although
involvement in a given extracurricular activity may not implicate a FAPE, the District
Court correctly held that the allegations here do not refer to any such activity. Instead,
Defendants’ alleged disability-based discrimination and failure to accommodate F.S.’s
participation in the cheerleading program is a denial of her educational needs under the
IDEA, including participation in extracurricular activities.17
Furthermore, F.S.’s choice not to pursue her claims through the IDEA’s
administrative process is not determinative of whether they concern the denial of a
FAPE.18 F.S. argues “[t]he absence of [her] prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative
remedies bolsters the determination that [her] claim does not concern denial of a
FAPE.”19 We cannot agree. Fry merely required courts to consider the procedural history
of a suit in order to determine if a plaintiff’s midstream change of course is indicative of
a strategic attempt to avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.
B.
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See Wellman, 877 F.3d at 134; S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d
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We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the inability of a hearing
officer to award monetary damages does not render the administrative process futile. We
realize, of course, that a claimant may avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement when
“exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.”20 However, we have held that the mere
inclusion of monetary damages in a claim for relief does not necessarily establish the
futility that would avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.21 Moreover, a contrary
holding would allow any plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to the IDEA to avoid the
statute’s exhaustion requirement merely by adding a claim for monetary relief, thus
creating an exception that would eliminate the exhaustion rule.
III.
As we noted at the beginning, we are not unsympathetic to F.S.’s claims. She has
alleged discriminatory conduct by the Crestwood School District that, if proven, only
added to the formidable obstacles she and her parents already faced as they pursued the
kind of educational experience that F.S. was clearly entitled to. However, as the District
Court held, the merits of her claim simply cannot be adjudicated by a court if those
claims have not first been exhausted as required by the IDEA. We therefore have no
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alternative other than to affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint
without prejudice to F.S.’s right to pursue her claims administratively.
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